The Peterhead CCS project was expected to be the first full chain gas CCS project in the world. It planned to capture 1 Mtpa from the Peterhead CCGT power station on the north east coast of Scotland and store the CO 2 offshore, reusing existing infrastructure from the depleted Goldeneye gas field. The project was very advanced when cancelled and had submitted the Storage Permit Application to the UK regulatory authorities who had sent it on to the European Commission for their review.
Introduction
In response to the UK Government's solicitation for Carbon Capture and Storage projects Shell UK developed plans to convert the existing Goldeneye gas field into a CO 2 store. The work to assess the suitability started under the UK Government CCS Demonstration competition launched in 2007, when the plan was to store around 20 million tonnes of CO 2 sourced from the Longannet power station in Fife, Scotland. This project was later halted by the UK Government. Work resumed as part of the subsequent CCS Commercialisation Programme launched by the UK Government in 2012. This programme was cancelled by the UK Government in November 2015.
The second attempt to develop a CCS project involved transporting CO 2 from the Peterhead Power Station in North East Scotland directly offshore where it would tie into the existing 102 km Goldeneye to St Fergus gas export pipeline to transport the dense phase CO 2 to the normally unmanned Goldeneye platform above the field.
The Goldeneye platform is located ~100 km northeast of the St Fergus gas terminal (which is near Peterhead, Aberdeenshire, Scotland) in water of ~120 m depth. From here the CO 2 was to be injected into the depleted Goldeneye gas field for geological storage, reusing the existing hydrocarbon production wells, at a maximum rate of just over 1 million tonnes per annum.
Description of the geological store
The CO 2 was planned to be injected into the Captain Sandstone, predominantly in the Captain D interval, using the existing hydrocarbon production wells for 10-15 years, with provision for expansion to up to 20 million tonnes in total. The injection depth was around 2516 m [8255 ft] below sea level into the previously gas bearing portion of the high quality Captain Sandstone. At the Goldeneye field, this sandstone has permeability of between 700 and 1500 mD. Structural dip closure is provided to the east and south and is interpreted also to the west; whilst pinchout of the Captain reservoir sands to the north provides an additional stratigraphic trapping element. Since 2004, the field has produced 568 Bscf of gas and 23 MMbbl of condensate. During production, the field experienced moderate to strong aquifer support -which also served to end the gas production from the wells as each well sequentially cut water and was shut in.
The primary CO 2 storage mechanism would have been accommodation in the pore space previously occupied by the produced gas and condensate from the Goldeneye field. A secondary mechanism was immobile capillary trapping in the water-leg below the original hydrocarbon accumulation. All the trapping mechanisms are described in more detail by Snippe and Tucker in [1] . Were CO 2 to be injected into the field it would displace the invaded water back into the aquifer. The CO 2 would form a layer due to gravity and unstable displacement effects, and during the injection phase some of the injected CO 2 would be displaced below the original oil-water contact. Once CO 2 injection has stopped the CO 2 is predicted to flow back into the originally gas bearing structure. Between 20% and 30% of the CO 2 that was displaced into the water-leg remains trapped in place due to capillary forces.
Analysis and modelling have shown that the field and water-leg have sufficient capacity to store over 30 million tonnes of CO 2 -more than sufficient for the 20 million tonnes requested in this application without requiring expansion into the adjacent aquifer, which has a much larger capacity as described by the CO 2 Multistore project [2] which modelled the injection of 180Mt at the Goldeneye location using both the field and the adjacent aquifer.
Vertical containment is provided by the 470-700 ft [143-202 m] thick storage seal that has held the Goldeneye hydrocarbon gas over geological time. The seal is penetrated by five development wells and four exploration and appraisal wells. All have been assessed as providing excellent zonal isolation.
Extensive technical details can be found at the UK Government knowledge sharing website which contains many of the technical reports generated during the project for Longannet [3] and Peterhead [4].
EU Storage directive and UK transposition
Member states of the European Union are required to transpose the directive on the geological storage of CO 2 [5] (often called the "CCS Directive"). In the UK the directive is implemented in The Energy Act of 2008, particularly in Chapter 3: Storage of Carbon Dioxide. In section 18 this act sets out the framework that allows the awarding of licenses for the storage of CO 2 by a licensing authority. In addition to the license a lease from The Crown Estate, the "land owner", is needed for storage activities for all offshore areas. The Energy Act makes provision for a licensing regime the details of which are outlined in the Carbon Dioxide (Licensing etc.) Regulations 2010, The Storage of Carbon Dioxide (Termination of Licences) Regulations 2011. The storage licence does not give permission to inject, this permission is conferred by a storage permit which must include all the conditions outlined in the CCS Directive. In many paragraphs the UK regulations refer back to the CCS Directive directly.
A number of other documents also inform the content of the storage permit application. These are the Guidance Documents [6] that were issued by the EU Commission along with the CCS Directive, and also specific application guidance issued by the UK Oil and Gas Authority -the UK licensing authority for CCS. If the permit does not cover all the points above, including those laid out in Annex I, then it will be rejected as incomplete.
Components of a storage permit application

Right of review
Article 10 of the CCS Directive makes provision for the EU Commission to review the storage permit application and the awarded storage permit.
"1. Member States shall make the permit applications available to the Commission within one month after receipt. They shall also make available other related material that shall be taken into account by the competent authority when it seeks to make a decision on the award of a storage permit. They shall inform the Commission of all draft storage permits and any other material taken into consideration for the adoption of the draft decision. Within four months after receipt of the draft storage permit, the Commission may issue a non-binding opinion on it. If the Commission decides not to issue an opinion, it shall inform the Member State within one month of submission of the draft permit and state its reasons. 2. The competent authority shall notify the final decision to the Commission, and where it departs from the Commission opinion it shall state its reasons."
The aim of the commission is that "The review of draft approval decisions should, in the same way as the review of draft storage permits at Community level, also help to enhance public confidence in CCS"
Structure of the permit
The Goldeneye storage permit application was designed to address all the requirements of both the CCS Directive and the UK regulations.
Because the storage permit application was going to be reviewed by multiple parties, including consultants employed by the EU commission, the team made the decision to create a self-standing permit application and to extract material from the underlying technical reports detailed in [5] . These technical reports had been written over a period of five years by various authors and totaled many thousands of pages. During this time the Goldeneye gas field had stopped production, the reservoir pressures had evolved, additional analytical laboratory work had been performed, and the development concept had altered from 2Mtpa for ten years to 1Mtpa for fifteen years. Collating all the relevant information into a consistent set of chapters was designed to make the task of any reviewers easier.
One of the tasks of the permitting authorities is to ensure that all requirements laid out in the CCS Directive had been addressed. To make this task easier the team created a concordance table to cross reference between the UK regulations, the EU Directive and the permit application to show exactly where and in which part and chapter each statutory requirement had been addressed.
The permit application was divided into seven volumes, plus the Offshore Environmental Statement. The image to the right is the Goldeneye duck after which the gas field was named.
Completeness and the EU review
The EU Commission review period of four months only starts when the Commission has received the full permit application, the Environmental Statement, the proposed permit from the competent authority, and had all their questions for additional information and clarification answered.
It is important to be aware of this in project planning as the review period does not start until the Commission is satisfied that it has all the necessary information.
The logic behind the permit application structure
The aim in writing the Goldeneye storage permit application was to lay out all the evidence in support of the containment integrity and the suitability of the store, and then let everything follow from this. At the same time it was necessary to satisfy the requirements of the CCS directive. This led to the following structure:
Detail all the evidence from site characterization and design [~400 pp] II.
Bring the evidence together in a containment risk assessment [~200 pp] III.
Design the MMV plan based on the containment risk assessment [~90pp] IV.
Outline the corrective measures that complement the monitoring plans to create additional safeguards for containment [~90pp] V.
Present the closure and post-closure plans that draw their evidence from the conformance results derived from the monitoring [~25pp] VI.
Outline the financial security that is based on the site selection and characterization, the design decisions, and the risk assessment results [~10pp]
In this manner, although the monitoring and corrective measures do provide additional safeguards and do impact the containment risk assessment, it should be possible to read the application from end to end and get a logical flow.
Within the extensive characterization volume the same stepwise approach was attempted, with the following chapters:
• All other volumes referred back to the characterization volume.
External review
The project was a first of a kind in the UK. The team therefore sought to gain an external perspective. Key areas were:
• Containment assessment -was this sound?
• The monitoring and corrective measures plans -were they sufficient or too extensive • Handover criteria, which are part of the closure plan • Duration of post-closure monitoring before final handover The British Geological Survey (BGS), a government funded and independent institution of excellent standing in the UK, and an institute with significant expertise over many years in the area of CO 2 storage, was employed to run an independent review.
The BGS recruited a team of experts from the BGS and HeriotWatt University. The review took place over a period of several months in the first part of 2014, and followed an iterative process of document review, response and discussion between the review team and geoscientists and engineers from Shell.
The review finds are public and on the BGS website [7] and the NERC website [8]. The review team had access to twenty technical documents including the draft storage permit application. The team identified issues and these were addressed in a two-day Engagement Session between Shell and the review team. The Engagement Session comprised fourteen technical presentations from Shell and detailed discussions on the points of issue. A set of remaining issues were then transmitted to Shell for response and actions. Actions included additional modelling, clarifications and text redrafting. A second, one-day Engagement Session was held and this comprised thirteen presentations from Shell addressing the points of issue and further detailed discussions. A draft review report was produced and, after provision of further documents, remaining minor residual issues were addressed before the review was finalized.
The project team found the review very constructive, and despite initial concerns about cost increase the review identified redundancy in the MMV plan and simplification in areas such as handover criteria. It led to a better more streamlined storage permit application.
The review also led to external confirmation that the store was suitable: "Our conclusion is that the proposed Goldeneye storage site is suitable for the purpose of storing up to 20 million tonnes of CO 2 injected according to the specified plan. BGS have signed a statement to this effect"
Containment assessment
The project team used the bowtie risk assessment technique for CO 2 storage containment assessment. Bowtie analysis provides a readily understandable visualisation of the relationships between the causes of unwanted events, the escalation of such events to a range of possible outcomes, the controls preventing the event from occurring, and the mitigation measures in place to limit the consequences. Illustrating the preventive and mitigative controls against their respective causes and consequences in such a structured way demonstrates that risks are understood and are being controlled, and can highlight gaps in risk control which should be a focus for remedial action. The bowtie diagram, Figure 3 , provides a simple visual demonstration of the way in which risks are managed. This allows understanding at all levels (including non-risk specialists) giving everyone the opportunity to review the existing controls in place and to identify any potential improvements. This risk assessment technique has been discussed by Tucker et al. [10] .
While the bowtie analysis can show that sufficient barriers exist to reduce the chance of a significant irregularity to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP), it cannot give information as to which of the potential migration pathways is more likely, with and without monitoring and remediation barriers. The team therefore also developed a spreadsheet-based, semi-quantitative model, to calculate the relative contribution to loss of CO 2 containment from the different release mechanisms and determine the benefit afforded by monitoring activities. The various potential migration routes evaluated are shown schematically in Figure 4 . Development of the model involved the following: • Translating the threat likelihoods assigned during the bowtie workshops into numerical frequencies per year; • Converting the prevention and mitigation measure effectiveness ratings into numerical probabilities of failure (i.e. the probability that the measure would not work effectively); • Combining the threat likelihoods and prevention measure failure probabilities along each bowtie branch to give a total end-of-branch frequency at the centre of the bowtie diagram; • Summing the threat end-of-branch frequencies together for each bowtie. The bowties were structured such that the threat branches were independent of each other as far as possible, to allow the end-of-branch frequencies for all the threats on a single bowtie to be added together to calculate the frequency of the bowtie's top event; • Feeding these forward into the consequence branches for that bowtie, to estimate an overall frequency of each consequence. Any threat on a given bowtie can lead to any consequence, and so the total summed frequency at the top event is fed forward as the initiating frequency for each consequence branch; and • Combining the consequence frequencies and mitigation measure failure probabilities along each branch to give a total end-of-branch frequency of a release with the potential to impact people, the environment or the project's reputation.
Where prevention or mitigation measures along a bowtie branch are independent from each other, their probabilities of failure can be multiplied together to give the overall end-of-branch frequency. For the left side of the bowtie diagrams, the bowties were adjusted if necessary to remove dependencies (i.e. by combining two dependent preventive measures into a single measure). On the right side of the bowtie diagrams however, complete removal of all dependencies was not possible. For example, mitigation measures which involve taking corrective action to limit the severity of the consequences are dependent on mitigation measures which involve detecting the CO 2 release -correction will not be attempted if the release has not first been detected.
Fault trees were therefore constructed to confirm the mathematical logic required to determine the relationship between factors such as initial branch frequencies and prevention and mitigation measure probabilities of failure, to give overall bowtie end-of-branch frequencies.
Although the estimates from the Goldeneye semi-quantitative model were intended to be relative values rather than absolute values, they were compared with data available within the industry and from analogous industries. A survey of published literature was carried out to determine predicted frequencies of CO 2 loss of containment incidents arising from the various release mechanisms covered by the Goldeneye model. In particular, a frequency of loss of containment from well-related incidents was established from the literature using hydrocarbon data as an analogue. This choice of analogue is likely to be conservative as CO 2 wells are designed to higher standards than some of the older hydrocarbon wells around the world that are included in the release statistics. This comparison indicated that the loss of containment frequency from well-related incidents predicted in the risk assessment model was generally consistent with the estimates given by the model, so there was no need for any adjustment of the model inputs to calibrate its outputs against published values.
A full discussion of the results is outside the scope of this paper, however the modelling confirmed that concentrating monitoring efforts round wellbores was logical and also that the risk was significantly lower after injection ceased and wells had been plugged. In all cases the probability of releases in any given year giving risk to the environment was judged to range between 1/100,000 and 1/10,000,000. An analysis of the consequences of this very unlikely leak was performed and it was estimated that because of the monitoring and corrective measures plans no leak path should be able to remove more than 1.5% of the CO 2 stored from the primary containment and that the pathways that could move CO 2 to the atmosphere were unlikely to be able to move less than 1% from the store before repair. So it concluded that there was a lower than 1/100,000 probability of being able to remove a worst case maximum of 1.5% of the CO 2 from the store.
MMV and Corrective Measures plans
The Measurement, Monitoring and Verification (MMV) and Corrective Measures (CM) Plans are designed according to the systematic risk assessment explained above which informs containment and conformance monitoring activities to achieve the regulatory objectives in two ways:
• verifying the expected effectiveness of existing safeguards (barriers to prevent loss of containment) created by site selection, site characterization and engineering designs • creating additional safeguards using the same monitoring systems to provide an early warning system to trigger timely corrective measures designed to reduce the likelihood or the consequence of any leakage from the storage complex The MMV Plan includes a base case monitoring plan and contingency monitoring plan. In the unlikely case that base case monitoring indicates a potential loss of containment, the contingency monitoring plan will be activated. This, supported by an updated risk assessment, supplies the basis for a range of actions to prevent, mitigate or remediate any actual loss of containment as summarized in the Corrective Measures (CM) Plan. The CM Plan is site specific, risk based and covers the entire storage complex. The MMV plan has been described in more detail in [11] , [12] and [13] and more detail is given on the corrective measures plan in [12] .
The results of the bowtie assessment highlighted that while the probability of any migration was extremely low, if something were to happen then it would be more likely to take place along an open wellbore. For this reason the MMV plan places significant emphasis on monitoring the wellbores. Corrective measures for open wellbores are well established in the oil industry and have been proven to be able to remedy well related irregularities. Therefore the MMV/Corrective Measures combination creates an effective safeguard against these well related migration pathways.
Post closure plan and handover criteria
In Article 18 on transfer of responsibility the CCS Directive states that where a storage site has been closed pursuant to certain criteria then all legal obligations relating to monitoring and corrective measures pursuant to the requirements laid down in this Directive, the surrender of allowances in the event of leakages pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC and preventive and remedial actions shall be transferred to the competent authority on its own initiative or upon request from the operator, if the following conditions are met:
(a) all available evidence indicates that the stored CO 2 will be completely and permanently contained; (b) a minimum period, to be determined by the competent authority has elapsed. This minimum period shall be no shorter than 20 years, unless the competent authority is convinced that the criterion referred to in point (a) is complied with before the end of that period;
The aim of conformance monitoring throughout the project and in the period between the end of injection and handover is to satisfy point (a) above, i.e. show that all available evidence indicates that the stored CO 2 will be completely and permanently contained. Once this has been shown the site can be transferred to the UK Competent Authority. It is important to have a set of performance criteria against which to measure the monitoring results. In the Goldeneye structural store in a depleted gas field this translated into the following performance criteria:
• CO 2 is behaving as predicted and is unlikely to deviate from prediction o 3D dynamic simulation forecasts of the movement of continuous phase CO 2 indicate that the continuous phase CO 2 is approaching a gravity stable equilibrium within the site.
• No leaks or unexpected migration paths are observed: Two separate seismic surveys -with an expected separation of five years, show that continuous phase CO 2 is not migrating laterally or vertically from the licensed storage site. o In the Goldeneye specific case a post closure survey is a combination of a time-lapse 3D seismic survey for subsurface profiling and site surveys of well locations to look for surface indications of CO 2 leakage. While the CCS directive in point (b) above indicates that the minimum period could be 20 years, it also gives the latitude to the competent authority to determine the duration based on the risk. In the Goldeneye case this translated in to a performance based plan, not a time based plan. This is illustrated in Figure 5 . The logic is again step wise and the approach measured. All monitoring is aimed at identifying losses of containment and at giving data to constrain the conformance modelling. At the end of injection a seismic survey was planned to show, in combination with previous surveys, that no behind casing migration was taking place. If migration were taking place behind casing the abandonment would involve milling the casing and setting two new long cement plugs, if not then the abandonment would be less intrusive and would involve setting two long cement plugs inside the casing. A second survey would then be taken with a separation of at least five years to give time for any migration to create a CO 2 accumulation that would be detectable below 8000ft of solid rock. If interpretation of this second survey in combination with the results of all prior monitoring showed that the site was now secure then handover could be progressed.
EU Commission opinion
On the 21 st January 2016, after the announcement of the end of the commercialization process by the UK Government, the EU commission published its opinion on the Goldeneye storage permit [14] . The commission opinion is reproduced below as it provides valuable insight into the process and results. It is a matter of public record. The Oil and Gas Authority (OGA) is the competent authority of the United Kingdom for issuing CO 2 storage permits.
The prospective operator Shell U.K. Limited submitted an application to the OGA for a storage permit on 23 April 2015. On 29 April 2015, the OGA submitted the application to the Commission. On 24 August 2015, the OGA submitted a draft storage permit to the Commission for its opinion. The information submitted by the UK was not sufficient for the Commission to issue an opinion. Consequently, the Commission requested clarifications and additional information on various elements of the draft permit, application and accompanying documentation on 11 September and again on 8 October 2015. The OGA submitted these on 25 September and 12 October 2015 respectively. At this stage, the Commission deemed the file complete.
THE PROJECT
The project is intended to provide permanent storage of carbon dioxide in the depleted Goldeneye gas condensate field on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf. The CO 2 would be injected over a period of 15 years maximum, starting not earlier than 1 January 2019.
The source of CO 2 is the Peterhead power station in Aberdeenshire. CO 2 will be injected into the gas field using existing wells. The precise location of the storage site is defined and the storage complex includes the storage site and the overlaying strata.
In 2014, a review of the application by the British Geological Survey and Heriot-Watt University confirmed that the risk of leakage is negligible and that there is no significant environmental or health risk.
The monitoring plan includes details of the parameters to be monitored, the technologies to be used and the spatial and temporal aspects of it. The application provides assurance that corrective action plans are sufficiently developed in the event of significant irregularities developing within the site.
Closure of the storage site will take place when 15 Mt CO 2 has been injected over a period of 15 years or the maximum reservoir pressure of 379 bara has been reached. A provisional postclosure plan has been submitted and will be updated based on actual operations, modelling, and monitoring over the injection period.
Financial security will be provided to cover all obligations falling under the storage permit, including those for the closure of the storage site and the period until the licence is terminated, and liabilities for temporary continuation of operations if the permit is withdrawn. The financial security will be approved by the competent authority before CO 2 injection starts. According to the provisional post-closure plan, elaborated by the prospective operator and annexed to the permit, the post-closure monitoring period is foreseen for five years and request for transfer of responsibility is planned by the prospective operator after data is processed at approximately six years after closure. The competent authority reassured the Commission that by annexing the provisional post-closure plan to the permit, it does not agree to a transfer of responsibility after six years. The competent authority would consider the request to transfer the responsibility only if the surveys previewed in the plan demonstrate containment of the stored CO 2 and no irregularities are detected, which could be as early as six years. Nevertheless, it appears, from the documentation submitted by the competent authority, that the calculation of financial security will be carried out on the basis of a post closure monitoring period of six years, rather than the minimum of 20 years foreseen pursuant to Article 18(1)(b) of the Directive.
An environmental impact assessment was carried out and concluded that the major part of the project presents a minor or negligible environmental impact. For some aspects with a high or moderate environmental impact, potential mitigation actions have been proposed. However, an assessment of the effects of substances other than CO 2 that may be present in leaking CO 2 streams is not included.
COMMISSION OPINION
In accordance with Article 10 of the CCS Directive and based on its review of the draft permit, the Commission concludes that the draft storage permit fulfils the requirements of the CCS Directive save as outlined below. Moreover, the prospective operator appears technically and financially competent and capable of carrying out the planned CO 2 storage operation at the proposed storage site.
The Commission considers that, to prevent any negative impacts on the environment, an assessment of the effects of substances other than CO 2 that may be present in leaking CO 2 streams must be included in the Environment Statement before consent to the project is granted. Moreover, the Commission considers that financial security must be based on a postclosure monitoring period of 20 years in accordance with Article 18(1)(b) and Article (19)(1) of the CCS Directive. 
Developing a first of a kind storage permit application
The project team and the Oil and Gas Authority teams worked very closely. A whole day engagement session was run at the beginning of the process where technical presentations were delivered by the project team. A schedule of meetings and workshops was then established where the project developer and the regulator teams would meet. The permit application was divided into parts and in each meeting the plans for the next part were outlined and discussed prior to writing the formal text. The text was then developed and circulated to the regulator for comment at the next meeting. All feedback was then incorporated.
By the end of the process there were no surprises in the permit application, and the regulator had a detailed understanding and insight into the risk profile of the proposed project.
We recommend this collaborative process for any region trying to develop a storage permit for the first time. There are key differences between CO 2 storage and hydrocarbon production and these have to be recognised by both parties and designed into the permit application.
Interfaces between regulators
The project team found that different regulatory teams were responsible for the seabed monitoring and risk assessment and the geosphere & well monitoring and risk assessment. Because the CO 2 is injected at over 8000ft below layers of impervious rock, because of the extremely thorough risk assessment, and because the wellbores which cut across the containment layers are intensively monitored, then the risk to benthic populations is negligible, and any CO 2 migration will be detected at depth before it reaches the surface. This means that marine environmental monitoring does not perform a detection role, rather it is used to establish the undisturbed baseline environmental conditions should any significant irregularity take place.
The project team did not interact with the environmental monitoring team till late in the process, A more efficient engagement process would have been to conduct the engagement on the environmental monitoring with both regulatory teams together.
A similar experience was had when the team moved onto determining the financial security provision. This also required the engagement of a new team within the regulatory division, who also required a detailed understanding of the technical elements of modelling and risks included in the storage permit application. Joint or parallel engagements with all regulatory teams would have shortened the engagement period with the Regulators and made it more efficient.
The learning here is not to underestimate the novelty of CO 2 storage and to ensure that all regulatory stakeholders are effectively engaged early on, as the discussions develop. A parallel engagement approach to the different regulators, rather than a sequential one would have significantly reduced the length of the engagement process.
The form of the actual Storage Permit
The actual wording of the Storage Permit was only determined after the development of the Storage Permit Application. This led to some reformatting of the permit application and even some additional dynamic simulation runs to determine pressure bounds as it was found to be useful to apply maxima to the injection pressures. The team had not focused on this point because the injection volumes were only half the store capacity therefore there was no possibility of exceeding any geomechanical pressure limit therefore the pressure limits had not been critical in the design of the injection facilities.
This was a first of a kind issue, but it could be good learning for other first of a kind projects.
Conclusions
The Peterhead storage team developed a storage permit application for the Goldeneye depleted field store. While it is not known if this would have been granted a storage permit, the storage permit application appears to have satisfied the EU CCS Directive requirements for a storage permit application.
